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B y law, medicare's payment to a health maintenance organization (HMO) on behalf of an enrolled Medicare beneficiary should be 95 percent o f Medicare's cost had the enrollee remained in the fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare sector. It is not clear, however, that current payment rates reflect accurately the expected cost o f caring for the Medicare HMO enrollee in the FFS sec tor. Nelson and Brown (1989) estimate that Medicare may overpay HMOs by 15 to 74 percent because o f favorable selection into HMOs and a possible error in estimating the FFS costs of beneficiaries, but those estimates are disputed by the industry trade association (Gold and Palsbo 1989a,b) . Evidence from HMO behavior is mixed. The program grew rapidly during 1985 and 1986, but the rate of growth has declined substantially since 1986. Although 55 percent of the elderly live in mar ket areas with at least one Medicare HMO, only about 3.5 percent have enrolled in Medicare HMOs (data from the Office of Prepaid Health Care, Division of Contract Administration). Furthermore, some HMOs have dropped their risk contracts under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re sponsibility Act (TEFRA) and either left the Medicare market, or switched to other types of Medicare contracts. In 1987-88, 29 HMOs left the program. O f 132 plans with contracts on January 1, 1988, 37 decided not to renew their risk contracts with Medicare for 1989. Three o f these 37 HMOs switched from TEFRA-risk contracts to a health care prepayment plan (HCPP), or cost-based contracts. A similar pattern was observed during 1989 when 32 plans did not renew their contracts and six plans converted to cost or HCPD contracts. The terminating plans are small on average, but the majority attribute their nonrenewal deci sion to dissatisfaction with the current payment method.
The problems with linking HMO payments to the FFS sector, the hallmark of the present payment system, are both technical and concep tual in nature:
1. The FFS sector may not promote and maintain the health of Medicare beneficiaries efficiently (Chassin et al. 1986 ). In some geographic areas, the FFS sector may use resources wastefully, whereas in other areas beneficiaries may receive too few services. All provider payment systems, including payment to Medicare HMOs, should be designed to correct, rather than perpetuate, inefficiency. 2. Activity in the HMO sector may affect FFS costs. When Medicare HMOs enroll a high percentage of the elderly in a market area, the remaining FFS beneficiaries may represent a biased sample on which to base HMO payments. Also, the presence of HMOs in a market area could change the FFS style of medical practice, either through competitive pressure or because physicians who see both HMO and FFS patients change the way they treat their FFS pa tients as their proportion o f HMO business increases. 3. The current method o f calculating the cost o f caring for beneficia ries in specific geographic areas is complex and payments may be unstable from one year to the next.
Problems with the current payment method have fostered interest in examining alternative payment methods, which is the purpose of this article. To evaluate the likely success of alternative payment methods we first define objectives for HMO involvement in the Medicare pro gram. In the next section we discuss the effect of different payment methods on those objectives. We then analyze two sources of market failure in the Medicare health plans market, imperfect information and price distortions, and suggest two payment reforms, open enrollment and competitive pricing, to address those problems. We conclude by summarizing our recommendations.
Objectives of the Medicare HMO Program: Efficiency and Equity
The objectives of HMO involvement in the Medicare program are re lated to both efficiency and equity. When Medicare was implemented in 1966, physicians were reimbursed by fee-for-service and hospitals were reimbursed for their costs. By 1970, the inherently inflationary ef fects of these payment methods had resulted in serious projected budget deficits for the Medicare program. In their search for alternative pay ment methods, some analysts and policy makers proposed incentives for the provider community to form competing groups that would both in sure and treat patients. The most common model proposed was the pre paid group practice, a large, multispecialty medical group that would sell insurance directly to the consumer and be responsible for maintain ing the consumer's health.
Prepaid health care plans have been eligible to participate in Medi care since its inception. However, the retrospective cost-based reim bursement and cost-finding procedures used by Medicare differed substantially from the HMOs' usual rate-setting procedures (Langwell and Hadley 1989) . Consequently, Medicare cost contracts were not pop ular among HMOs. In 1972 Congress added section 1876 to Title 18 of the Social Security Act, which authorized capitation payment for A and B services on either cost or risk basis.
In his proposal for a "consumer choice health plan," Alain Enthoven (1978) suggested that Medicare beneficiaries be allowed to purchase cov erage from any qualified health plan in a market area. The govern ment's contribution would be based on the cost of an expanded FFS benefit package, including unlimited inpatient days and an upper limit on out-of-pocket spending. Chairing the Special Committee on Aging in 1979, Senator John Heinz stated that the primary goal of the Medi care HMO program was to open the system to competitive market forces (U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging 1979)-The bills then under consideration set HMO payment at 95 percent o f FFS costs, which Sena tor Heinz believed would result in windfall profits for HMOs. Peter Fox, director o f the Office o f Policy Analysis at the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), suggested during the 1979 hearings that HMOs be required to return any excess profits to enrollees in the form of cover age of preventive care, waiver o f coinsurance and deductibles, and addi tional benefits, in that order. It is important to note that the purpose of involving HMOs in the Medicare program was n ot to expand the benefit package. Expansion o f the basic benefit package was viewed only as a method of limiting HMO profits.
An interesting and divergent voice at the 1979 hearings was that of Ralph Saul, a health insurance executive, who testified that the federal government should replace its retroactive cost reimbursement system with a fixed premium contribution. Saul specifically recommended bas ing the government's contribution on premiums in a competitive envi ronment rather than FFS Medicare costs (U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging 1979).
As early as 1970, two different equity objectives were espoused for the Medicare HMO program: giving all health plans equal access to Medicare beneficiaries; and permitting Medicare beneficiaries the same access to health plans enjoyed by the under-65 employed population in market areas where HMOs were offered (Saward 1970) .
In the early 1980s, the HCFA developed a series of demonstration projects to test alternative forms of Medicare HMO risk contracting. In 1980 and 1981 eight plans began to enroll Medicare beneficiaries at re imbursement rates ranging from 85 to 95 percent o f the cost in the FFS sector (known as the adjusted average per capita cost, or AAPCC). If an HMO's projected payments exceeded its projected costs, known as the adjusted community rate (ACR), the HMO was required to refund the difference to the government, offer supplementary benefits to enrollees, or reduce the cost of supplementary benefits. In April 1985, risk con tracting became a permanent ongoing program under the TEFRA legis lation, and by October 1989, there were 131 participating plans with more than one million enrollees.
Relation Between Efficiency and Equity Objectives and Pricing Mechanisms
Health policy discussions in the 1970s and 1980s frequently focused on the relation between efficiency and equity objectives for the health care system and the way in which prices for health insurance and health care services are determined. Most of these discussions juxtaposed two alter native methods o f determining prices: competitive markets and regula tory or administered price setting.
The advantage of competitive markets lies in their ability to produce technical, economic, and distributional efficiency in the absence of mar ket failure. In a market for health insurance, such as the Medicare health plans market, technical and economic efficiency means that health plans promote and maintain their enrollees' health using the cost-minimizing quantity and combination of health care resources. Dis tributional efficiency means that no individual would wish to trade their combination of health insurance and income for another combination, given current prices and their income.
Certain types of natural or irrevocable market failure, for example, significant economies of scale in production, the requirement of "rightsof-way," or abnormally large capital requirements, arise and can be ad dressed only through the use of administered pricing. Also, a monopoly might be granted to a firm on the grounds of "countervailing power," that is, to combat the effects of monopoly or oligopoly in another in dustry (Scherer 1980) .
Markets for health plans and health services offer textbook examples of virtually every form o f market failure. These sources of market fail ures should be familiar, and include the tax exemption of employeepaid health insurance premiums (and even employer-paid premiums under section 125 o f the Internal Revenue Code), overly restrictive licen sure requirements, partial exemption o f the insurance industry from federal antitrust regulation under the McCarran-Furguson Act, poor in formation on the price and coverage offered by health plans (except for employees o f large firms with well-organized open enrollment periods), and a virtual absence o f information on the quality of care one is likely to receive in one health plan versus another.
However, after an extensive review o f sources o f market failure (Dowd et al. 1990 ), we found no compelling theoretical or empirical evidence that the health insurance industry exhibits inevitable or irrevocable market failure, or that the health services market is a monopoly or oli gopoly that would support the countervailing power argument. The most striking aspect of market failure in health care is not how much of it is inevitable or irrevocable, but how little of it has been addressed by government and how much o f it is the direct result of government policy.
Given the damage that government regulation has done to the health care market and government's apparent reluctance to address inherent problems of the market, such as poor information, it is difficult for us to be enthusiastic about administered pricing systems, including those for Medicare HMOs. Enthoven's (1978) numerous criticisms o f the regu latory approach to health care cost containment are still valid today. His concept o f a "managed competition" approach (Enthoven 1988b) involving competitive pricing among health plans has not yet been achieved in the Medicare program, nor has it been seriously pursued.
Removal o f barriers to competition in health plan markets generally is hindered by two popular misconceptions. The first is that competition forces low-income people out of the market for health care services. Al though competitive markets can promote efficiency, competitive mar kets, per se, are neither equitable nor inequitable. If low-income people are observed to consume a "socially unacceptable" low level of health insurance or health care services it is because o f high prices (which could indicate too little competition, rather than too much), their low in comes (which could be remedied by greater willingness on the part of society to transfer income from the wealthy to the poor), or their prefer ence for other goods and services versus health care. Effective competi tion would increase access for everyone by reducing the price of health care services to the marginal cost of efficient production.
The second misconception regarding competition is that the competi tive model was " tried" during the 1980s and failed to contain health care costs. In an article in Healthweek entitled " A Decade Later, Free Market Has Shown It Can't Keep the Lid on Spiraling Health Costs," Kimball (1989) writes, "The nation learned a painful lesson in the 1980's: Health care consumption cannot be curbed by traditional freemarket forces or government price constraints applied at a single pres sure point."
Statements of this nature are misleading on two counts. First, the purpose of competition is not to curb health care spending, per se, but to produce a set of efficient prices that allows consumers to maximize their welfare without waste in either production or consumption (Pauly 1990) . If consumers faced prices for health insurance and health care services that reflected maximum efficiency in production and still wished to spend 13 percent of their disposable income on health care (Economic Report o f the President 1991), there would be no objection on economic efficiency grounds. Second, none o f the many sources of market failure in health care was rectified in the 1980s, and few received even passing attention from policy makers. Although there was a great deal of talk about competitive markets during the 1980s, most of the changes in health care pricing involved administered pricing. Diagnosis related groups (DRGs) were introduced as a case-mix-adjusted, admin istered pricing system for inpatient services. HMO activity is the most frequently cited example of competition in health care, but the govern ment's payment to Medicare HMOs is set by the administered-price AAPCC formula, rather than by competitive pricing.
A well-run competitive health care system, managed effectively by a government "sponsor" (Enthoven 1988b) , is not a laissez-faire policy on the part of government. In fact, a well-managed competitive system may require as much effort by the government as administered pricing, but the potential benefits are substantial. Improved efficiency in the Medicare health plans market would allow beneficiaries to obtain health insurance coverage more closely matching their preferences at prices they could better afford.
Correcting Market Failure in the Medicare Health Plans Market
Bringing market discipline to the Medicare health plans market will require dramatic changes in market structure and the federal govern ment's role. Medicare policy can address two important sources of mar ket failure: imperfect information and payment policies that distort prices. The following discussion draws heavily on an analogy between Medicare health plans and health plans offered to employees o f a large firm or government unit. In fact, there are many similarities between the problems faced by Medicare in the health plans market and those faced by state governments and their employees. Many state govern ments offer a choice o f health plans to employees, just as Medicare of fers a choice of health plans in areas with Medicare HMOs. Health benefits offered by state governments, like Medicare, can be influenced by the legislative branch o f government, and state employees, like Medicare beneficiaries, vote. Also, many state employees belong to un ions, which are similar in agenda and influence (on health plan issues) to organizations lobbying for the elderly.
Im p e rfec t In form ation
The concept o f informed consumer choice depends on consumers having access to at least a minimal amount of information on the price and quality of products. Medicare beneficiaries face considerable difficulty in obtaining this information. Information on the prices o f products (in cluding TEFRA plans, HCPPs, and Medicare supplements) can be ob tained at some cost, but easily interpretable information on coverage is harder to obtain, and there is virtually no information available on the quality of care in different health plans. In the employed sector, wellmanaged firms hold annual open enrollment periods during which they identify options available to employees and distribute concise summa ries of the benefits and costs of alternative health plans. Another information problem linked to open enrollment policy con cerns the health plans' knowledge o f expected expenses for individual beneficiaries. All health plans gain an information advantage over their competitors by observing enrollees' actual cost experience. All plans, therefore, have an incentive to disenroll high-cost enrollees. The will ingness of FFS Medicare to accept HMO disenrollees continuously makes selectively encouraged disenrollment easier. This incentive is particularly strong in HMOs that also sell FFS Medigap coverage because their physi cians do not lose patients who disenroll to Medigap coverage. The em ployment-based group insurance market does not allow continuous open enrollment. Restricting plan switching to once a year reduces the likeli hood of employees joining a plan to use specific services and then disen rolling. This "hit and run" utilization is very expensive for health plans and could discourage them from providing high-quality care. Waiting periods for treatment of preexisting conditions can provide a barrier to hit-and-run utilization without open enrollment periods, but open en rollment periods do not leave beneficiaries without coverage and, in ad dition, facilitate the efficient distribution o f information.
Does restricting health plan switching to once a year represent an oner ous constraint? Employees in multiple-health-plan firms apparently do not think so. In fact, the ability of employees in large, multiple-healthplan firms to choose, annually, among all the health plans offered by the firm regardless of their health status is a luxury denied those in the individual and small group market and Medicare beneficiaries, as well. Comprehensive open enrollment, including all insurers that sell prod ucts in the Medicare health plans market, would guarantee beneficiaries annual, unrestricted access to all health plans in the market, including HCPPs and Medicare supplementary insurers, who presently can screen enrollees continuously.
Price D isto rtio n s
Medicare's HMO payment policy results in three types of price distor tions in the Medicare health plans market. The first is a subsidy of the FFS sector versus the HMO sector. The second is a subsidy o f the Medigap insurance industry. The third, and most important, is a distor tion in the price o f Medicare benefits purchased on behalf of beneficia ries by the government.
Subsidy o f the FPS Versus the HMO Sector. Suppose that Medicare HMOs can provide the same coverage and quality of care as the FFS sector for lower cost. Evidence from Manning et al. (1984) and Luft (1981) for the nonelderly population and Christianson et al. (1990) and McCombs, Kasper, and Riley (1990) for the aged Medicaid population suggests that they can meet this objective. Currently, however, HMOs cannot set their premiums less than the AAPCC payment (which is de termined by the cost o f basic Medicare benefits in the FFS sector). In other words, Medicare HMOs cannot give premium rebates. They only can add supplementary coverage so that their costs for the enhanced coverage are greater than or equal to the AAPCC. A summary of sup plementary coverage and premiums for Medicare HMOs in 1989 is shown in table 1.
Supplementary coverage may not be highly valued by all consumers. HMOs might be chosen by more consumers if they were permitted to give premium rebates and to offer a package o f basic benefits. Conse quently, as noted by McClure (1982) HMOs to give premium rebates protects the FFS sector from this form of competition. This source o f distorted prices could be remedied by allow ing Medicare HMOs to offer whatever benefit package they choose (at least equal to basic Medicare coverage) at whatever premium the market will bear. Subsidy o f the M edigap Insurance Market. The majority of Medi care beneficiaries in the FFS sector purchases " Medigap" insurance to supplement their basic Medicare coverage. Medicare's expenditures on the basic benefits package increase for these beneficiaries because the coinsurance and deductibles have been removed (Christensen et al. 1987 ). Up to 80 percent of the supplement-induced increase in Part B services is incorporated into Medicare's cost for basic FFS coverage. For supple ment-induced increases in Pan A expenditures, the percentage could be even higher because the Medigap insurer's liability is likely to be a smaller proportion of the supplement-induced increase in expenditures. The incorporation of these "spillover" costs into the cost of the basic benefit package represents a subsidy, paid by Medicare, of the Medigap premium.
A simple example illustrates the Medigap subsidy. Suppose that in the absence of a Medigap supplement, average expenditure per beneficiary on services covered by the basic Medicare benefit is $365 per month in the FFS sector and $280 in the HMO sector. Also suppose, for simplicity, that Medicare payments plus the Part B premium equals roughly 80 per cent of covered expenditures. Again, for simplicity, assume that HMOs are paid 100 percent o f the AAPCC rate, rather than 95 percent. Thus, HMO payment is .8 X $365, or $292 per beneficiary per month. (The FFS beneficiary pays .2 X $365, or $73 out o f pocket.) The difference between the HMO's cost and payment is $12. Because the HMO cannot return the extra $12 per month to enrollees under the ACR rules, it may cover the coinsurance and deductibles or add supplementary coverages to justify its $292 payment. The beneficiary's premium expense (beyond the standard Part B premium) for either the HMO or FFS is zero, but benefits are better in the HMO. Christensen et al. (1987) report that 72 percent of all FFS Medicare beneficiaries purchase Medigap policies, and the aggregate effect of those policies is to increase total expenditures on covered services in the FFS sector by approximately $85 per beneficiary per month (based on 1987 data presented by Christensen et al. 1987 Christensen et al. , inflated to 1992 . The government pays 80 percent of the $85 increase, or $68, and the beneficiary pays the additional $17. Thus, the government's cost of basic FFS benefits, and hence its payment to HMOs, rises to .8 X ($365 + $85), or $360 per beneficiary per month. The HMO must find additional benefits that justify the $68 increase in its payment. Benefi ciaries may or may not place a high value on these additional benefits. The beneficiary's premium expense is zero for the HMO and $73 + $17, or $90 a month for the FFS sector including the Medigap policy. (The beneficiary pays the Part B premium in either case.) Suppose, however, that the government removed the effect of Medigap policies from the AAPCC, returning the AAPCC-based pay ment to its original level o f $292, and added its share of the spillover cost, .80 x $85 or $68, to the Part B premium for beneficiaries with Medigap coverage. If HMO benefits returned to their original level ($292), the beneficiary's premium expense would be zero for the HMO and $450 -$292 = $158 for basic FFS benefits plus the Medigap policy, and benefits might be similar in the two plans. Failure to remove the ef fects of the Medigap policy from the government's contribution to pre miums in the FFS sector subsidizes the Medigap policy. Basing HMO payments on FFS costs, which include the spillover effect of Medigap policies, makes it even more difficult for HMOs to market low-cost poli cies effectively.
Another feature of the Medigap market that affects Medicare HMOs is the fact that many employers subsidize the purchase of Medigap poli cies by their retired employees. These policies not only fill the "gaps" in basic Medicare coverage, but often add supplementary coverage (Jensen and Morrisey 1990) . The employer subsidy usually is limited to a partic ular insurer with whom the employer has contracted. This discourages enrollment in Medicare HMOs not included in the employer's plan. If the federal government would stop subsidizing Medigap coverage, em ployers and retired employees would face the true marginal cost of sup plementary insurance policies. They would be more inclined to contract with Medicare HMOs if the HMO offered similar coverage at lower cost.
There are at least two ways to address this price distortion in addition to allowing HMO premium rebates. The first is to apply a tax to Medigap premiums equal to the effect of the Medigap policy on basic FFS Medicare costs. To produce efficient consumer choices the tax prob ably should be paid directly by beneficiaries along with the Medigap premium. This option would remove Medicare's subsidy of Medigap premiums and, if the tax was applied against Medicare's FFS costs, would allow HMOs to reduce their level of benefits because the govern ment's net cost, and thus the HMO's payment, would be reduced to
Another approach, which avoids the cost o f collecting a Medigap tax, would be to calculate the effect of a Medigap policy on the cost of basic Medicare coverage, set the government's contribution at FFS costs in the absence of Medigap benefits ($400), and then require both HMOs an d Medigap insurers to accept that contribution (plus whatever premium they charge for supplementary benefits) and cover the cost o f both basic and supplementary Medicare benefits. In other words, Medigap insurers would enter the market on the same terms as Medicare HMOs. How ever, even if policies are developed that remove the subsidy of Medigap policies, the problem o f basing the federal government's contribution to health plan premiums on costs in the FFS sector would remain.
The D isto rted Price o f Basic Medicare Benefits. Offering better in formation, allowing HMOs to give premium rebates, and eliminating the subsidy o f Medicare supplementary insurance would be major im provements in the Medicare health plans market. However, these re forms do not address the most important shortcoming of the current HMO payment system: failure to use the HMO program to help deter mine the correct price of basic Medicare coverage, that is, the price rep resenting maximum efficiency in the production and maintenance of health among Medicare beneficiaries. Indeed, if HMO premium rebates were allowed and became widespread, it would indicate that the govern ment is trying to spend more on health insurance for the elderly than the elderly wish the government to spend on health insurance, or would choose to spend themselves. In other words, the elderly would rather have the money to spend on other things.
If HMOs can provide basic Medicare benefits for lower cost and the same quality o f care as the FFS sector, then the government, by basing its premium contribution on FFS costs, is paying too high a price for ba sic benefits. Paying too high a price will result in inefficiently low levels of Medicare benefits. Some o f the resources spent on basic benefits could be used to reduce government expenditures or provide more gov ernment services to the elderly. For example, it is difficult to consider covering long-term-care services under Medicare when the government is overpaying for basic Medicare benefits. In addition to being inefficient, overpayment may be considered inequitable by the nonelderly popula tion, which provides a substantial income transfer to fund the Medicare program.
A C o m p e titiv e Pricing System f o r M edicare
The greatest contribution that a properly structured payment system for Medicare HMOs can make to the Medicare program is to reveal the cor rect price o f basic Medicare benefits. Unfortunately, in its current form, the program cannot accomplish that task. In fact, the current program almost certainly increases the cost of basic Medicare benefits because the government's premium contribution is based on FFS sector costs and be cause of favorable selection into HMOs (Brown 1988) . If, as Nelson and Brown (1989) suggest, the AAPCC estimate is miscalculated, the HMO program is even more likely to increase Medicare's costs. Furthermore, current Medicare HMO payment policy actually discourages HMO growth by shielding beneficiaries from the price difference of basic ben efits in the HMO and FFS sectors.
To find the right price o f Medicare benefits and encourage the growth of efficient health plans, Medicare must break the link between its contribution to Medicare premiums and FFS costs. Instead, Medicare should base its contribution (in either the HMO or FFS sector) on the premium o f the most efficient health plan in a given market area. Re taining the current FFS-based payment system, even if HMO premium rebates are allowed, is distinctly inferior to a payment system based on the most efficient health plan's premium for basic benefits.
The structure of the payment system would be as follows: Medicare, like a self-insured employer offering multiple health plans, would pre pare an estimate of its average cost for basic FFS coverage in the coming year in a market area. HCFA already estimates Medicare's average FFS cost in every county in the United States each year as part of the AAPCC. This estimate should be revised to exclude the spillover cost of Medigap insurance. Suppose, for example, that this estimate is $400 per month per beneficiary in a given market area. Prior to the open enroll ment period, each HMO in the market area that wished to enroll Medi care beneficiaries would submit its premium for basic Medicare benefits. HCFA's estimate of FFS costs would not be announced until after the HMO premiums were submitted. Possible HMO premiums for basic coverage are outlined in table 2. An interesting question is the treatment of the current Part B pre mium. The government's contribution to the beneficiary's premium could be set equal to the lowest bid ($300), the lowest bid minus the current Part B premium, or some value in between. The important point is that the beneficiary face the full marginal cost of choosing a more expensive health plan. The beneficiary's cost of the lowest-priced plan would be no greater than the current Part B premium. Each health plan could add any supplementary coverage and charge whatever sup plementary premium the market would bear. Under our Medigap pro posal, the government also would offer FFS Medigap insurers $300 per month (or $300 minus the Part B premium) for each enrollee. Medigap insurers who wished to enter the market would have to cover the cost of basic Medicare benefits, but they could add any additional benefits at whatever additional premium they wished. The health plan's incentive to submit a low price for basic coverage would be to distance its pre mium expense from those of its competitors. All health plans, including FFS Medicare, would be responsible for collecting any premium owed by beneficiaries. FFS Medicare beneficiaries already pay premiums for Part B Medicare and private health plans collect premiums from benefi ciaries as a matter of daily business. Avoiding the cost of collecting pre miums, however, would provide an additional incentive for health plans to be the low bidder.
Although current FFS Medicare would be an expensive choice relative to the most efficient HMOs, that need not remain the case. HCFA has many cost-containment initiatives in place or under study for FFS Medi care-including DRGs, relative value scales for physician reimburse ment, and preferred provider organizations. These initiatives might reduce the cost o f FFS Medicare to levels at or below the HMOs' costs.
Government premium contributions based on the most efficient health plan in a given market area could result in different levels of pre mium expense for the same health plan in different market areas. Bene ficiaries' premiums also could vary from year to year as health plans enter and leave the market. If an efficient health plan were available in an urban area, for example, the government contribution might be lower than in a rural area where only FFS Medicare was available. This might seem inequitable. However, health care consumers in urban and rural areas experience many disparities. Some disparities benefit urban residents, who, for example, have better access to tertiary medical care. Whether a larger government premium contribution to FFS Medicare in rural areas would be viewed as inequitable, given other disparities in the health care system, is unclear. It is likely that a higher government pre mium contribution in rural areas would encourage health plans to enter those markets, thereby increasing access to this form o f delivery system for rural consumers. In any case, the FFS alternative would remain avail able in all areas.
Our proposal for Medicare HMO payment reform is not only feasible, but currently is in place in the employed sector. The state governments o f Minnesota and Wisconsin offer multiple health plans to their em ployees and base their contribution to premiums on the premium of the most efficient health plan in a market area. The Minnesota state govern ment plan is described in the Appendix.
Other Issues

B ia sed S election
Whenever multiple health plans are offered, health risks are unlikely to be distributed equally among the plans. Some plans will enjoy favorable selection, (i.e., the enrollment of relatively low-risk individuals), and others will face adverse selection. A crucial question concerns the effect o f nonrandom risk selection on efficiency and equity in the health plans market. Those effects depend on the extent to which health plans can identify high-and low-risk enrollees prior to enrollment and the extent to which health plans can risk-adjust their premiums.
As Pauly (1984) notes, if health insurers can identify high-risk enroll ees prior to enrollment and are allowed to risk-adjust their premiums, the outcome will be efficient, but may be considered inequitable be cause high-risk enrollees will pay higher premiums. An individual could be rated high risk because o f "permanent" factors such as age and sex, or could become high risk following the onset o f illness. Pauly (1970) shows that if health plans are forced to offer the same product to all beneficiaries at the same premium (a "community" rate), the outcome is inefficient. Pauly (1984) argues further that forcing insurers to com munity-rate may cause them to engage in active cream-skimming. The undesirable equity effects of risk-rating could be avoided by structuring income transfers, for example, through premium subsidies, so that lowrisk beneficiaries subsidize high-risk beneficiaries. Pauly (1984) notes that unless those subsidies are means-tested, healthy poor beneficiaries will subsidize wealthy, high risk beneficiaries, and that also may be con sidered inequitable.
Even if health plans cannot identify high-and low-risk enrollees prior to enrollment, characteristics of the products they offer may serve to seg ment risks in the market (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) . These charac teristics include the comprehensiveness of benefits, the limited provider networks used by staff and group model HMOs, and HMOs' aggres sive management of costs. High-risk individuals with a history of illness often have developed relationships with FFS providers that they are un willing to sever and the HMOs' reputation for aggressive cost manage ment may encourage high-risk enrollees to stay in the relatively "unmanaged" FFS sector with a Medigap supplement. Low-risk enroll ees will join managed care HMOs and will benefit from competition among HMOs. These benefits include enhanced coverage and other amenities that enrollees can easily observe.
Medicare HMOs under the TEFRA-risk program currently are prohib ited from risk-adjusting their premiums for either basic or supplemen tary coverage, but the AAPCC-based payment formula attempts to risk-adjust the government's premium contributions. However, because the AAPCC risk categories explain less than 1 percent of the variance in expenditures in the FFS population, HMOs can be expected to engage in whatever subtle forms o f cream-skimming they can devise. Pauly's (1984) recommendations for improved efficiency would imply risk-rated premiums for Medicare HMOs, accompanied by means-tested income transfers. Although we do not take issue with Pauly's logic, we think there might be a simpler approach that should be tried first in the Medicare health plans market.
In large firms, premiums may differ among health plans (if more than one is offered by the firm), but individual risk-rating within a health plan is extremely rare. Why is this form of community rating suc cessful? This question is addressed by Dowd and Feldman (1992) . First, employees join the firm primarily to gain employment, not insurance (although insurance occasionally may be an important factor). Thus, employees are not likely to leave a firm simply because they are offered a better deal on their health insurance. Second, the firm is able to guar antee that the pool will be replenished continuously with healthy em ployees, thus assuring employees that should they become high risk, there always will be low-risk employees available to subsidize their care.
Medicare also has the ability to guarantee continuous replenishment of low risks into the Medicare pool and thus, if managed correctly, could offer Medicare beneficiaries the same benefits enjoyed by employ ees of large, multiple-health-plan firms. A well-organized, annual open enrollment period with limited plan switching at other times would transform the Medicare market from the relatively inefficient individual insurance market to a model more closely resembling a large, multiplehealth-plan firm, simultaneously addressing the problem of poor infor mation and doing more to alleviate concern over risk selection than a complex risk-adjusted payment formula (including different prices sub mitted for different risk classes) or unrestricted risk-rating accompanied by income transfers. We note again that if all plans marketing to Medi care beneficiaries were required to participate in the open enrollment period, Medicare beneficiaries could be guaranteed annual, unrestricted access to all available health plans.
The concern over risk selection expressed by Medicare TEFRA HMOs originates largely in the individual nature of the Medicare market and the fact that their competitors are allowed to screen potential enrollees. An open enrollment period with all Medicare health plans participating would address these concerns. Although biased selection remains an im portant issue when multiple health plans are offered, we believe that correcting health plan payments for possible biased selection deserves less attention from policy makers than basic market reforms.
In addition, we believe that health policy analysts may not fully ap preciate the importance of the positive association between managed care and favorable selection. A health plan that provides more careful management of care is likely to experience favorable selection. Sub sidies to health plans that experience adverse selection must be carefully structured to compensate the health plan only for the p a rtia l effect of risk selection on premiums, controlling for undesirable health plan char acteristics, such as "failure to manage care," that may attract poor risks. Obviously, compensating plans for failing to manage care could inflict serious damage on the efficiency o f the health plans market.
Some private-sector firms have taken an alternative approach to the problem of risk selection by offering only one health plan. For example, they might aggressively shop for a health plan rather than have their employees choose among multiple health plans. The health plan se lected by the firm may develop multiple "options" such as a prepaid group practice, a preferred provider organization (PPO), and a tradi tional FFS plan. In that case, biased selection among options is a prob lem for the health plan to manage, rather than the employer's problem.
Despite interest by some employers in replacing multiple health plans with a single plan, many large employers have offered multiple health plans for many years because employees value diversity of choices. Offering multiple health plans provides Medicare beneficiaries the same benefit o f diverse choices. We have found that offering multi ple health plans, per se, tends to increase average premiums in firms (Feldman, Gifford, and Dowd 1992) , primarily because of favorable se lection into HMOs and the unaddressed imperfections in the health in surance market discussed earlier. A successful multiple-plan firm does not take a laissez faire attitude toward its health plans. It aggressively manages the FFS plan and negotiates carefully with HMOs. It also pro vides concise summaries o f health plan coverage during annual open en rollment periods. It does not link the employer's premium contribution to the price of any health plan other than the most efficient plan, and especially not to the FFS health plan. We believe that neither employers nor the government should consider offering multiple health plans un less they are prepared to apply every possible form of market discipline on their health plans. To maximize the efficiency gains from competi tion through multiple health plan offerings, HCFA should undertake research to determine the most effective management strategies for mul tiple plan offerings, and then be prepared to adopt the strategies that seem to be effective. HCFA can follow the example of successful multi ple health plan firms, but it also may have to lead the way in develop ing and implementing some market reforms.
D o M edicare H M O s M ake Excess P ro fits?
Policy makers have always been concerned that Medicare HMOs will make excessive profits. This concern currently is expressed in the ACR rule, requiring HMOs to spend excess profits on supplementary bene fits. We believe that HMOs may be overpaid for basic benefits (Brown 1988; Nelson and Brown 1989) . Overpayment, however, need not im ply excessive profits. If the market for supplementary benefits is suffi ciently competitive, HMOs' profits will be competed away regardless of the ACR rules.
We have examined empirically the competitiveness of the supple mentary benefits market by estimating the relationship between Medi care HMO enrollment and supplementary premiums charged by HMOs, controlling for a number of characteristics of the HMO and its market area and the supplementary coverage it offers (Feldman et al. 1991) . The results suggest that demand for most TEFRA HMOs is relatively price sensitive, although 13 large HMOs appear to make excessive prof its. A relatively low markup, resulting from competition with Medicare supplementary insurers and HCPPs, explains how TEFRA HMOs can enjoy favorable selection and still be dissatisfied with their profit mar gins in the Medicare market. A low markup also suggests that removing the ACR rules would allow HMOs to offer basic coverage with premium rebates, without risking excessive profit-taking by the HMOs.
Specific Recommendations for Medicare HMO Payment Reform
Our specific recommendations for Medicare HMO payment reform ad dress the problems of distorted prices and poor information. The recom mendations can be implemented in three phases.
Phase 1
Some price distortions in the Medicare health plan market can be cor rected regardless of HCFA's method of paying Medicare HMOs. These corrections constitute our first set o f recommendations. First, HCFA should discontinue the adjusted community rate (ACR) and allow Medi care HMOs to offer whatever benefits they choose (at least equal to basic Medicare coverage) at whatever premium the market will bear. If the HMO can offer a benefit package at least equal to basic Medicare cover age for less than its AAPCC-based payment, and wishes to give a pre mium rebate, it should be allowed to do so. Allowing HMOs to offer different levels of benefits does not preclude HCFA from establish ing a rating system, similar to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA)-90 categories implemented for FFS supplementary insurance policies in 1991, to assist consumers in making their choices. Second, to prepare for implementation of competitive pricing, HCFA should study the effect of TEFRA-risk HMOs selling FFS Medigap policies on FFS sec tor costs. TEFRA-risk HMOs whose physicians also treat FFS Medicare patients have a strong incentive to encourage selective enrollment or dis-enrollment in the TEFRA-risk plan. Finally, as a part o f Phase 1, HCFA should undertake an independent assessment of current methods used to calculate the AAPCC in order to verify Nelson and Brown's (1989) finding that Medicare HMOs may be overpaid by 15 to 74 percent. This assessment should focus on the finding that the current AAPCC may not measure accurately the cost o f caring for FFS beneficiaries in the FFS sector, and probably should be directly calculated from average expendi tures in the AAPCC risk categories in a national random sample of mar ket areas. The cost of this study is very small compared with the amount of probable current overspending.
Phase 2
The recommendations in Phase 2 are designed to improve information in the Medicare health plans market. HCFA should contribute to the cost of providing information to ben eficiaries on the coverage and premiums offered by Medicare health plans and should support initiatives to provide information on quality of care in health plans. Also during Phase 2, the federal government should end its subsidy of the Medigap market either by taxing Medigap premiums or by requiring that all Medigap insurers accept the HMO capitation payment and assume responsibility for basic Medicare cov erage.
Phase 3
Phase 3 constitutes full-scale implementation of the competitive pricing system. During Phase 3, HCFA should set its contribution to premiums as a function of the lowest price for basic Part A and Part B Medicare benefits (or some other basic benefit package specified by the federal government) submitted by a qualified plan in a predefined market area. This contribution should be paid on a "level dollar" basis to all health plans, including FFS Medicare. The FFS premium, or expected average cost of caring for FFS beneficiaries in a market area, is already being cal culated as part of the AAPCC payment. In the competitive pricing sys tem, HCFA should be an aggressive manager of the FFS sector. As manager of the FFS health plan, HCFA should pursue aggressively any cost-containment mechanism it thinks will improve the competitiveness of the FFS plan. Those mechanisms may include both regulatory approaches to cost containment, such as DRGs, and compeddve ap proaches, such as competitive bidding for specific services. No current HCFA cost-containment initiatives in the FFS sector necessarily are af fected by our recommendations. As overall manager of the compeddve pricing system, HCFA should be permitted to pursue federal prosecu tion of antitrust violations by health plans participating in Medicare. This enabling legislation should override any exemption granted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
At a minimum, these recommendations apply to 57 metropolitan sta tistical area (MSA) markets with more than one active Medicare HMO, which contain 40 percent of the U.S. elderly population. The recom mendations might also apply to 39 additional MSAs with one Medicare HMO and more than one HMO operating in the employed sector. The recommendations would stimulate HMO growth and encourage the de velopment of additional Medicare HMOs in areas currently not served by a Medicare HMO or served by only one.
Our list of recommendations leaves several important details of the competitive pricing system unresolved:
1. How should the competitive pricing system be administered? It is important for the government "sponsor" of the competitive pric ing system to have intimate knowledge of local market areas, im plying state or regional administration. 2. How should market areas be defined? In the state of Minnesota's competitive pricing system, HMOs are required to serve state em ployees in any county where they serve anyone. Medicare might consider a more flexible approach, as long as safeguards against market segmentation were in place. 3. How should payment adjustments, such as those for a dispropor tionate share of Medicare patients, teaching, and capital costs, be treated under the competitive pricing proposal? The answer to this complex question should be based on an analysis of the beneficia ries of these adjustments. By definition, the recipients of charity care are not in a position to pay for the benefits they receive, but one could argue that subsidizing free care for the poor benefits all members of society. If so, the disproportionate-share adjustment should be removed from calculation of costs in the FFS sector and financed out o f general tax revenue. We do not have specific rec ommendations at this time, beyond noting that, in general, those who benefit from each o f the payment adjustments listed above should bear the cost.
Not all o f our recommendations are new or original. The concept of basing Medicare's contribution on premiums in a competitive market was proposed by Ralph Saul (U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging 1979). McClure (1982) proposed open-enrollment periods for Medicare, a fixed government contribution to premiums, and legalization of pre mium rebates. Luft (1984) also wrote on the effects of fixing the govern ment's contribution. Enthoven (1988a,b) has detailed Medicare's role as an active "sponsor" and manager of a competitive market for Medicare health plans. McCombs (n.d.) drew the analogy between Medicare's current payment policy and a voucher system, suggested a voucher sys tem for setting the AAPCC, and pointed out the problems of omitting the FFS sector from the voucher system.
Our recommendations may not be popular, initially, with Medicare beneficiaries who currently benefit from a large government contribu tion to premiums based on FFS costs. However, beneficiaries and their lobbyists probably are aware that, in the face o f current budget deficits, an expansion o f the basic Medicare benefits package will be difficult or impossible as long as the government's price for the current package re mains dramatically inflated.
Any recommendation that reduces payment to HMOs will be unpop ular with the HMO industry, particularly the less efficient HMOs. The HMO industry may be more enthusiastic about the recommendation that Medicare end its subsidy of the FFS sector and bring the structure o f the Medicare market closer to that of employment-based insurance.
Although our primary concern in this analysis has not been the popu larity of our recommendations with the interest groups they would af fect, we realize that even if our recommendations are technically correct, HCFA may be constrained politically from implementing them. Because the current Medicare HMO program almost certainly increases the cost of basic Medicare coverage and may actually discourage Medicare HMO enrollment, we believe that Congress should seriously consider terminat ing the Medicare HMO program if payment reforms cannot be imple mented. We would make the same recommendation to a large employer that followed Medicare's current policy of basing the firm's premium contribution on FFS costs, distributing little or no information on health plans to its enrollees, and allowing HMOs to disenroll members continuously to the FFS sector. Such a firm almost certainly could re duce total premiums (paid by both the employer and employees) by of fering only a FFS plan, even if the FFS plan was rather inefficient. HMOs could reduce this firm's total health care expenses only if the HMOs experienced adverse selection, or if the efficiency o f the FFS plan was positively influenced by the presence o f HMOs. Current empirical evidence suggests favorable selection into Medicare HMOs, and no pub lished study to date has shown that increased HMO market penetration reduces total Medicare costs in a market area.
---------. 1990. Financing Health Care. Quarterly Review o f Economics a n d Business 30(4):63-80. Rothschild, M., a n d j. Stiglitz. 1976 Before 1985, the cornerstone o f the state's approach to health plan contracting was a fee-for-service (FFS) plan offered through Blue Cross/Blue Shield. This was the original plan in the program before the advent of HMOs, and the only plan available statewide. During most of the 1980s this plan had half or more o f the total group enrollment, and in recent years was offered on a self-insured basis.
Until its repeal in 1985, a state law allowed any HMO into the pro gram that wished to be offered. This law resulted in the state offering a large number of HMOs-at times as many as ten. HMOs are available only in certain parts of the state, with the largest number in the Twin Cities.
Until 1985, the state contribution toward the cost o f health insurance was tied to the FFS plan -100 percent contribution for employee cover age, 90 percent for dependent coverage. Employees did not receive a re bate for picking an HMO that cost less than the FFS plan; however, they had to pay the difference if they picked a more expensive plan. HMO rates tended to cluster near the FFS rate. The state did not critically ex amine the rates submitted by the HMOs and Blue Cross/Blue Shield.
The health benefits program experienced a watershed year in 1985, although the full extent o f change did not become apparent until 1988. During this period the state consolidated its HMO offerings and changed the basis for determining its premium contribution. These changes eventually led to significandy increased competition among the insurers and HMOs that participate in the state's program. From a high o f ten HMOs, the state began 1990 with six. This reduction occurred for a variety of reasons, including:
1. 1985 repeal of the state law requiring an open-door policy toward HMOs 2. HMO attrition and mergers 3. rejection o f applications to join the plan from HMOs that did not meet the state's criteria and objectives 4. departure o f an HMO that could not maintain reasonable pre mium rates 5. the end of the policy of allowing an insurer or HMO to offer more than one option to employees or to add plans at its own initiative
Having fewer HMOs simplified the competitive dynamics among the state's health plans. Fewer HMOs meant that the remaining plans had a better chance of gaining a significant market share, and more to gain Abbreviations: FFS, fee for service; HMO, health maintenance organization; IPA, independent practice association; PPO, preferred provider organization.
